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NOTES
REQUIREMENT OF CERTAINTY IN NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS; EFFECT OF INTERPRETATION
OF N. I, L. BY STATE COURTS ON
FEDERAL COURTS
First National Bank of Miami v. Bosler, 297 Pa. 353,
147 Atl. 74, decided that a note is not negotiable under the
provisions of sections I and 2 of the Negotiable Instruments Law where it contains the words, "with interest at
the rate of 8% per annum until fully paid", and also the
provision, "Deferred payments are to bear interest from
maturity at 10% semi-annually". The note was drawn and
made payable in Florida. Suit was begun in Pennsylvania,

and there having been no proof of the law of Florida, the
question of negotiability was determined in the light of the
Negotiable Instruments Law as adopted in Pennsylvania.,
As a matter of fact the same act has been in force in Florida

since 1897.

The court found the above provisions irre-

concilable as to the rate of interest payable after maturity,
thus rendering the amount payable uncertain.
Long before the adoption of the Negotiable Instruments Law it was a well established rule that a negotiable
instrument had to contain "an unconditional promise or
order to pay a sum certain in money' ' 2 As to what constituted a "sum certain" was a matter of frequent dispute."
By section 2 of the N. I. L., it was sought to clarify the

meaning of "sum certain" by making definite provision as
regards the usual cases in which dispute arose and about
'Act of May 16, 1901, P. L. 194.
2
Smith v. Nightingale, 2 Stark, N. P. 375, (Eng. 1818); Ayrey v.
Feamsides, 4 M. & W. 168 (Ex. 1838); Lowe v. Bliss (1860) 24 111.

168.
sNational Bank v. Feeney, 12 S. D. 156, 80 N. W. 186, 46 L. R. A.
732; Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. McCow, 32 Okla. 277, 40 L. R. A.
(N S.) 177; Woods v. North, 84 Pa. 407; Johnson v. Speer, 92 Pa. 227.
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which there was a split of authority. This section did not
provide for the problem of uncertainty raised by this case.
nor was it directly ruled upon by the courts of Pennsylvania before the adoption of the N. I. L.
The question which appears to have been left unsettled
is the time when certainty of amount must appear. Is it
essential that such certainty appear after as well as at or
before maturity? It might be argued that certainty after
maturity is immaterial; that dishonor renders the note nonnegotiable to the extent that one cannot become a holder
in due course after maturity; and that if the amount due on
the note at any time before or at maturity is fixed and
certain, its negotiability is not affected by a provision which
may render the amount uncertain after it has been dishonored. There are several decisions of the Federal courts
which support this proposition.' But this would seem to
ignore the express provision of section 47 of the N. I. L.:
"An instrument negotiable in its origin continues to be
negotiable until it has been restrictively endorsed or discharged by payment or otherwise." There are cases construing this section which hold a bill or note negotiable after
maturity.5 If this section of the act contemplated notes that
are negotiable after maturity, surely the provision requiring
a promise to pay a "sum certain" must be held equally to
apply after maturity in all those cases which do not fall
within the express provisions of section 2 of the act.
In Merill v. Hurley, (1895) 6 S. D. 592, 62 N. W.
958, the court said:
"According to one theory, a note is certain when
there is no date at which the exact amount then due
cannot be ascertained by inspection and computation.
According to other authorities, such a degree of certainty is required that the amount to become due and
payable at any future date must be clearly ascertain4Farmers National Bank v. Sutton Mfg. Co. 52 Fed. 191; Capital
City Bank v. Swift, 290 Fed. 505.
5Williston on Contracts, vol. 2, p. 2138; Pensacola State Bank v.
Melton. 210 Fed. 57; Barnes v. Carr, 65 Fla. 87, 61 So. 184; Lane v.
Hyder, 163 Mo. App. 688, 147 S.W. 514.
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able at the date of the note, uninfluenced by any condition not certain of fulfilment".
Applying the first test suggested here to the note in question, we find that there is a date at which the exact amount
then due cannot be ascertained by inspection or computation. What interest is to be paid subsequent to maturity,
8% or 10%? If we apply the second test we find that at the
date of the note the amount to become due after maturity
is not ascertainable.
In Davis v. Bradey, 17 S. D. 511, 97 N. W. 719 suit
was brought by an endorsee of a note containing the same
conflicting provisions as appeared in the Bosler case. The
provisions follow: "with interest until fully paid at the rate
of 10% per annum" and "If said interest is not paid when
due, it becomes a part of the principal and draws interest
at the rate of 12o per annum until paid". The court said,
"It is doubtful whether the amount for which the
note was given and unpaid interest draws interest annually at 10% or whether the principal augmented by
the first and subsequent installments of overdue and unpaid interest draws interest at 12% until the entire
amount is paid. Such uncertainty destroys the negotiability of the instrument".
That this case should have some weight in support of
the decision of the court in the Bosler case is shown by
reference to section 196 of the N. I. L. which provides, "In
any case not provided for in this act the rules of the law
merchant shall govern". But what is the "law merchant"?
As pointed out by Dean Trickette "This expression reveals
that the Commissioners were subject to the hallucination
that there was such a thing as the 'law merchant'. There
is no more a law about bills and notes detached from any
particular sovereignty than there is a law about real property or torts". This section merely adopts the rules of the
common law when the particular case is not provided for
by the act. There are analogous cases, decided in Penn6Trickett. "Some Observations on the Negotiable Instruments Act",
21 Dickinson Law Review 35.
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sylvania before the adoption of the N. I. L., which hold
that uncertainty as to the amount payable after maturity.
as in the case of a provision for the payment of reasonable
attorney's fees, renders the note nonnegotiable.7
It has been argued that the note here can be construed in two different ways, and that under either construction it can be held negotiable., First, by allowing the
8% interest provision to prevail after maturity, the sum
payable becomes definite enough and is expressly provided
for in Section 2 (1) of the N. I. L. as being within the
meaning of "sum certain"; or second, allow the 10% interest provision to prevail after maturity, and the case will
fall in line with those holding a note providing for a higher
rate of interest after maturity negotiable." But, does not
the very fact that the note is possible of two constructions render it nonnegotiable? Let us suppose that this note
is offered to two prospective purchasers,-the one might
construe the 8% interest provision to prevail after maturity, while the other might construe the 10% interest provision to prevail. The necessary result of such a situation
would tend&to restrict and limit the free saleability of the
note, the very purpose of negotiability. The offer of this
note, containing the conflicting interest provisions, to the
average layman, would be to raise a doubt as to the certainty of the amount payable after maturity.
Because of the common law rule in Pennsylvania which
holds notes in analogous cases nonnegotiable, and because
the burden placed on the prospective buyer of construing
the conflicting provisions of such a note would impair its
saleability, it would seem that the decision of First National
Bank of Miami, Fla. v. Bosler, 297 Pa. 353 was proper.
The decision of this case raises a second interesting
problem. As already stated, the Pennsylvania court decided the case under its interpretation of the N. I. L. After
TWoods v. North, 84 Pa. 407 (1877); Johnson v. Speer, 92 Pa. 227

(1879).
&Herbert F. Goodrich, Penna. Bar Quarterly, December 1929.

951 A. L. R. 294; Hutson v. Rankin (1922) 36 Idaho 169, 213 Pac.
345; Kuhn v. National City Bank (1918) 187 Ind. 726, 119 N. E. 145.
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the decision of this case, a lower court in Florida held a
similiar note negotiable.1o It is not known to the writer.
whether this case was decided on the same point as was
raised in the Bosler case. Subsequently suits involving
similar notes were brought in the Federal courts and the
question now arises whether the Federal courts are bound
to follow (1) the Pennsylvania decision; (2) the decision
of the lower court in Florida; (3) or ignore both on the
ground that such a case presents a matter of general commercial law. about which the Federal courts are at liberty
to exercise their own independent judgment?
As a general rule, the question of the negotiability of a
note is one of general commercial law which, at one time,
was determined by the Federal courts without reference to
decisions of state courts.'
Before the universal adoption
of the Negotiable Instruments Law, when an action was
brought in a Federal court on what purported to be a
negotiable note, the court was not concerned about the
state decisions which might govern the matter. This freedom which the Federal courts exercised before the adoption of the N. I. L. by all the states was not an attempt to
establish a common law of the United States, but was
merely an assertion of a right to interpret the common law
of a state so as to bring about uniformity of the law of
negotiable instruments as among the states. As expressed
by the court in Hudson Furniture Co. v. Harding, 70 Fed.
468, "There is no common law of the United States except
possibly as the common law of England has been adopted
with reference to the construction of powers granted to the
Federal Union". In this case the court announced the rule
that state legislation with respect to the law merchant must
be enforced by the Federal courts, and that the Federal
courts are bound by decisions of the State courts construing the same. Since the purpose sought by the Federal
lONew Miami Shores Corp. v. J. D. Edley, No. 11450, Civil Court
of Record of Dade County of Florida. Opinion by Judge A. J. Small,
lCapital City State Bank v. Swift, supra; Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet.
1, 10 L. Ed. 865; Burgess v. Seligman. 107 U. S. 20; Pana v. Bowler,
107 U. S. 529,
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courts in exercising their independent judgment in matters
of commercial law was accomplished with the general
adoption of the N. I. L. by the states, it would seem that
the Federal courts are bound by decisions of state courts
construing such statutes.
In view of whathas been said, it is interesting to note
what was said in the recent case of Marion Wood v.
Thomas R. Heyward:12
"While it is true that the Federal courts will ordinarily accept decisions of appellate courts of a state
in respect to the statutes of that state, they are not required to do so upon a question of general law such as
raised in the instant case, and accepting fully, as we
do, the conclusions of the court of Pennsylvania in the
Bosler case, we should not feel bound by a contriary
decision even though it were that of an appellate court
and not, as it is, that of a lower court".
More in line with the view of the writer is the recent case
of Wood v. Formad, 13 in which Judge Kilpatrick, in determining the negotiability of a note similar to the note in
the Bosler case, both the Pennsylvania decision and the
decision of the lower court of Florida being before the
court, said:
"The terms of the Negotiable Instruments Law.
in force in Florida govern. There is no interpretation
of that statute by the Florida court of last resort. Since
the adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments
Act, the provisions of that act must be followed,

wherever in force."

The purpose of the N. I. L. was to make uniform the
law of negotiable instruments and eliminate the conflict
in doctrines which tended to hinder commercial transactions. It sought to codify the law so as to relieve the courts
of the burden of choosing between conflicting cases and
discordant views, and to render certain the matter of
12United States District Court, Western Dist. of Pennsylvania.
Opinion by Justice Gibson, October 31, 1932.

'sUnited States District Court, Eastern Dist. of Pennsylvania, No.
16924, March Term. Decided Oct. 25, 1932.
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negotiability, so that the business of the commercial world
could be conducted in conformity to a law that was itself
certain. That the states were desirous of accomplishing
this purpose is shown by the general and speedy
adoption of the act. If we are to follow the decision in
Marion Wood v. Thomas R. Heyward, supra, allowing the
Federal courts to exercise their independent judgment
whenever a matter of commercial law arises, thus establishing a common law of the United States separate from the
state law, then the purpose of the N. I. L. fails.
In Savings Bank of Richmond v. National Bank of
Goldsboro, 3 Fed. (2nd) 970, 39 A. L. R. 1374, the court
said:
"The interpretation placed by a state's highest
court upon its statutes will be accepted and followed
by the Federal courts though questions of commercial
law and general jurisprudence may be involved or incidentally arise, and especially where the statute is
one enacted in the interest of uniformity in commercial
law as a Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act".
In light of the considerations above, it would seem
that the Federal courts are bound to follow the interpretation of the act as pronounced by the appellate courts of
Florida. But, since there has been no interpretation of the
act by an appellate court of Florida, the Federal courts are
bound to follow the interpretation of the act as laid down
in First National Bank of Miami v. Bosler, 297 Pa. 353.
W. Burg Anstine.

LIABILITY OF A MASTER FOR A LOANED
SERVANT
It is a well established principle that one having a
servant in his general employ may lend or hire the servant
to another person for a particular piece of work.' When a
'Milwaukee Loco. Mfg. Co. v. Point Marion Coal Co., 294 Pa. 238
(1928); Tarr v. Hecla Coal & Coke Co., 265 Pa. 519 (1920); Standard
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 212 U. S. 215.

